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The Thansatlantic
Agenda comes
of age
The European Commission  adopted  on
20 March 2001 a Communication setting out
its ideas for reinforcing  the Transatlantic
Relationship, assessing prlgress achieued to
date, and exploring  ways in tahich the
Transatlantic dialogue could be improued.
The ubimate objectiue is, as t/te text itself goes,
'to go beyond consultation  towards  A mlre
action-oriented  relationship  based on real
accomplishments'.  The document ltas trigered
d process of reflection and debate within the
EU. The US Administration has already
prouided  an initial positiue reaction.
The EU and the US corrduct their relations  within the
framework of thc 1995 New 'l ransatlantic  Agenda
(NTA),  a comprchcnsivc declaration which led to a
qualitative leap in Tiansatlantic  co-operation. The
Commission's  proposal is birsed on the experience
gained during the fivc ycars of NTA existence, taking
into accour.rt its successful  points, but also keeping in
mir.rd its perceived shortcornings. It provides  an assess-
ment of the current state of play and, at the outset of a
new US Administration,  r.nakes suggestions on how to
establish clear priorities for EU- US co-operation  in
the years ahead.
In particular, the (lomrr-rission  proposes to define a
limited number of strategic themes, and to select a lim-
ited number of orioritv issues within
themes *.r. .on.r"t. iesults will be
achieved in the short to mediurn term.
The proposed  priority-settir.rg mecha-
nism will ensure bcttcr focus. continu-
iry of issues,  and a result-oriented dia-
logue. Streamlining currenr stt'uctures  is
another important element of the Communication.
The process is intended to result in an even closer rela-
tions-hip, with more concrete benefits for the partners
(continued  cn page 3)
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and increased global progress as well. As President
Prodi declared, at his recent encounter with US
Secretary  of State Powell,
"The European  Union and the United States have a
unique partnership ... when we work together we can
set the agenda on the international scene. Our com-
bined economic and political strengths  create  a respon-
sibiliry to co-operate  closely in order to find answers  to
pressing global problems as well as to different threats
to regional stability. The two strongest  economies of
the world and the largest global trading and investment
relationship  provide many opportunities for our busi-
nesses and citizens  as well as a responsibiliry for both
sides to overcome  differences".
It is the objective of the new Communication to pro-
vide new impetus to this common  effort.
The full text of the Commission's Communication  on
Tiransatlantic  Relations  is auaikble  on the interne,  at :
b ttp : /  /  europ a. eu. i n t/  c o mm /  e  xte rn a l_re lat i o n s /  us /  n ew s /  ip _
01 421.htm
Highlights from the EU -
US Ministerial meetirg in \Tashington
Commissioner  Patten, Foreign Minister Lindh, representing the Council Presidency,  and the High
Representatiue Jauier Solana met US Secretary of State Colin Powell on March 6 to discuss a range
of  foreign p o licy maters
The EU and the US meet in this format twice ayear to
move forward  the EU / US foreign policy agenda.  This
was the first such meeting with the new US
Administration  agenda.
At the March 6 Ministerial meeting in \Tashington  a
wide range of important topical matters  were discussed,
from the Middle East to the \Testern Balkans and
Russia.
Secretary Powell took this opportunity  to reaffirm the
US commitment to Europe, and to a constructive rela-
tionship  with the EU and- stressed the need to remoye
irritanti, in particular  trade disputes.
The Secretary of State's  words well describe the positive
atmosphere of the meeting and the wide scope of
translatantic co-operation:
"We enjoyed  a positiue and consnuctiae  exchange  as we
addressed some of the most important issues on the United
States-European  Union  agenda.  . . fo*ering  p eace and
Stability in tbe Middle  East, promoting democracy in the
Balbans,  combating the spread  of weapons for mass
dcsmtction, and deuelop  a European  security and d.efence
poliqt that strengthens  the NATO alliance".
Some of the points discussed.
At the opening of the meeting, Secretary of State Colin
Powell confirmed that President  Bush was accepting
the invitation  to attend an EU-US summit in June in
Sweden and gave an indication of some of the issues
that the US would like to see on the aqenda  for the
summit discussions.
fu regards the Middle East, Colin Powell expressed
concerns about the current situation  and underlined
the importance  of preventing an economic collapse of
the Palestinian Authority.  Both sides agreed that
enhanced co-operation in the region was necessary
with a view to achieving a return to the negotiating
table.
Remaining in the same region, Secretary of State
Powell indicated that the US would work to target Iraq
sanctions  against weapons of mass destruction,  an
approach  which was welcomed by the Foreign  Minister
Lindh.
The United States and the EU reaffirmed their com-
mitment  to strengthening democracy  and stabiliry in
the'Western  Balkans. NAIO and the EU will work
together  with the objective of creating a stable region
in the centre of Europe.
fu regards Russia, the enlargement  of the EU and the
imDortance to maintain Russia involved in the devel-
opments of the European  Securiry  and Defence  Policy
were discussed.  The two parties  agreed on the impor-
tance of a common  EU - US approach vis-)-vis  Russia.
Secretary of State Powell welcomed the development of
a European Security and Defence Poliry which would
Cet: t IZUstrengthen  NAIO and increase Europet capaciry to
deter and manage crises.
Finally, Foreign Lindh reiterated EU concerns about the
retention of the death penalty in the US. Secretary
Powell indicated  that he understood  the arguments, but
did not expect the situation to change in the short term.
After the meeting, Commissioner  Patten clarified  the
state of play as regards communicable  diseases in
Africa.  Europe aims at making access to drugs  easier,
while preserving  the interests of the pharmaceutical
companies.  Vorking together with the United States
o.r this difficult issue will give better prosPects of suc-
cess in tackling  one of the downsides  of globalisation'
The good atmosphere of the Ministerial  meeting  and the
reffirmed enuironment  to closer co-operation haue now,
we hope, set the tone for a successful EU - US summit,
notu confirmed  to tahe lace on 14 June in Giiteborg,
Sueden.
Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol,
more urgent than ever
US President Bush has just announced his unwillingness  to ratifit the l{yoto Protocol, signed by the
(IS, the EU and a largt nurnber of other countries. This comes as a aer! unfortunate and sffong
blou to the current effirx to combat the highly worrying rffiat of climate change. The climate
change talks suspended last Nouember in The Hague uere to be resumed fom 16 to 27 July in
Bonn. The resumed sixth Conference  of the Parties to the UN Frameworh Conuention  on Climate
Change (COP6) should prouide a new opportunity to reach final agreement on the best means for
implementing  the l{yoto protocol. The talhs were set for July in order to allow time for Gouernments
to prEare fulb fo, the decisions that will haue to be reached. But this work, uhich is in turn the
resub ofyears of continued ffirts, is now jeopardised.
The EU has made clear its dismay  at this announce-
ment together with its determination  to act anc
explain the urgency of finding global solutions to the
climate change  problem, which threatens not only
today's'World population and resources but the future
generations  as well.
'The US must understand that this is
not a marginal issue for the EU [...],
and cannot be played down
( C  o m m i s  s i o n e r Wa I  ls tro m)
Immediately  after knowing President Busht decision,  a
highJevel EU team left for the United States, to seek
clarification  and to reiterate the importance  that the EU
attaches  to this capital issue. Despite intensive  work,
the team led by Commissioner'W'allstrom  came back to
Brussels without receiving  any encouraging  signs from
the US side. The US position  was defined as 'extreme-
ly worrying' by Commissioner lVallstrom. 'The US
must understand  that this is not a marginal issue for the
EU [...], and cannot be played down', she said.
Previously, in a letter to Republican senators, President
Bush had already stated his opposition to the Kyoto
Protocol, questioning  the state of scientific  knowledge
on the causes of climate change. He also reversed  a key
environmental  campaign pledge by indicating that his
Administration will not require the US power plants to
reduce emissions of carbon dioxide. This stance was
already a considerable  cause of concern to the EU, but
it was far from the abrupt decision in the latest
announcements.
The climate is already changing
due to human interference -
latest reports predict a global average
temperature rise by 1.4 - 5.8 degrees
centigrade within the next century.The EU has consistently stressed commitment to the
Kyoto Protocol and the importance of domestic action
by the industrialised countries, responsible  for the lion's
share of greenhouse gas emissions, to achieve the neces-
sary emissions reduction  targets. It is for the United
States and the European  Union to lead by example,
whilst at the same time continuing to encourage action
from Developing  countries to limit their emissions of
gfeennouse gases.
The EU is anxious  that the US should not withdraw
from the fight against global warming and is pressing
the new Administration  to give serious consideration  to
recent scientific evidence. The findings of the Third
Assessment  Report of the UNt Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate  Change point to th"e potentially dev-
astating  effects on the environment  caused by the
release ofgreenhouse gases. The Report indicates  that
the climate is already changing due to human  interfer-
ence and predicts a global average temperature rise by
| .4 - 5.8 degrees centigrade  within the next century.
EU Environment Commissioner  Margot'W'allsrom
stated that "Nobody should ignore these warnings".
The EU is still urging the US to stay committed to the
international process of tackling global climate change,
and hopes that the US will reconsider  its position  and
will join the resumed COP6 negoriations to finalise
workable and environmentally  sound means to imple-
ment the Kyoto protocol as quickly as possible. A EU
Ministerial  Delegation went to New York on 2l April
to undertake new consultations with the US. The EU
aims to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in 2002 with or with-
out the United States, Mr $0'allstrom explained. But
creating a level playing field will of course be much
more difficult if this unfortunate  decision  is not recon-
sidered.
More information  about this issue can be found at:
http : //wwu. eurunion.  org/news/speeches/200  I /0 I 0403mw.
hnn, and
http : //wuw. eurunion.  org/neu.,s/press/200 I /200 I 02 5. htm
Nielson,  Busquin, Liikanen, Byrne, Lamy and Patten,
sets out an ambitious  agenda  in the following three
areas:
. improvement  of the impact of existing development
assistance programmes.  There is a need to deliver
greater amounts of assistance, more efficiently  and in
a more co-ordinated way to affected countries.
Prevention will remain at the forefront of our policy.
. increase the affordabiliry  of key pharmaceuticals  in
the developing countries and
. increased investment in research and the develop-
ment of global public goods to confront these dis-
eases in the developing countries.
The main elements  of the EC Programme for Action  are:
. increase  in the money allocated  to health, HIViAIDS
and population programmes  as delivery capaciry
improves. For 2000, the EC has committed €800
million under the Health, Aids, and Population pro-
gramme.
'  setting up in developing countries of pharmaceutical
policies better adapted to their needs, support for
investment in the development of local production
capacity.
. A commitment in favour of tiered pricing  where
developing countries pay the lowest possible price for
medicines.
. An acknowledgement of the possibiliry to explore the
best use of compulsory licensing systems.
Access to medication for the world's poor
On 18 December 2000, the EIJ and US Summit  leaders reiterated their commitment to join forces
t0 turn the tide on the spread 0f HIWAIDS, malaria and tuberculosis in Africa.
The Summit Statement  mentioned  the co-operatton
between EU and US diplomats  in Africa, who are
encouraging  local governments  to set national priori-
ties, to establish health sector and action plans to
strengthen  capaciry to deliver health services and treat-
ment and to commit resources.  Prevention and care are
mentioned  as prioriry  areas for supporting  sub-Saharan
African  health policies.
The EU and the US agreed that
both sides will urge pharmaceutical
industry to make drugs for
HIV/AIDS,  malaria and tuberculosis
more affordable for the poor
The Statement  also points to the need to advance on
research co-operation and to make pharmaceuticals  and
commodities more accessible and more affordable.  The
EU and the US agreed that both sides will urge phar-
maceutical  industry to make drugs for HIV/AIDS,
malaria  and tuberculosis more affordable for the poor.
Since then, the EC is advancing  considerably and has
formulated  its policy on HIV/AIDS, malaria and
tuberculosis  in the context of poverty reduction.  On 21
February 2001, the European  Commission  adopted a
Programme for Action for the next 5 years. The
Programme,  which was presented by Commissioners. A commitment by the Commission  to launch a
debate in the \X/TO on reconciling  the TRIPS agree-
ments with the objectives of health protection in
developing  countries.
. In the area of research, launching of a major initia-
tive concerning clinical trials to speed up the process.
Work with developing countries to strengthen  pharma-
ceutical  policies will continue,  as will efforts to explore
and support opportunities  for local production of
pharmaceuticals  and to build their capacity to manage
health, research and trade-related  issues including the
implementation  of the TzuPS agreement.  Public sup-
porr for research and development will be reinforced
through better co-ordination  in Europe, in line with
the objectives of the European  Research Area, and
incentives  introduced  to encourage private investment,
and ensure participation ofdeveloping countries at all
stages ofthe research process. Building increased capac-
iry for research in developing countries will also be a
Parucular prlorlry.
The Commission  is particularly
interested to work with the US
Government to lower the prices
for key pharmaceuticals  for
the developing countries
At the beginning of March, Commissioner  Patten sent
a letter to US Secretary  of State Colin Powell to draw
his attention  to this EC Programme  for Action and to
invite the US to join forces in implementing measures
to turn the tide on the three diseases. The
Commissioner indicated that the EC is particularly
interested  to work with the US Government  to lower
the prices for key pharmaceuticals  for the developing
countries, as this seems to be the most realistic and fea-
sible means to deliver results on a short term basis.
In his reply, Secretary Powell expressed interest to
remain in close dialogue  on all policy questions  for
combating HIV/AIDS,  malaria and tuberculosis.
A differendal  price system
can only work if we avoid product
diversion and re-importation.
Industry is a key partner for such a system.  Last year,
the Accelerating  Access Initiative was set up by five
research-based  pharmaceutical companies  (Boehringer
Ingelheim, Bristol Myers Squibb, Hoffman La Roche,
ClaxoSmithKline  and Merck) and five international
organisations  (UNAIDS, UNICEB UNFPA, W'orld
Bank and \7HO) to accelerate  access to HIV/AIDS
related medicines  and care in developing countries.
Arrangements  on lower prices for developing countries
have now been made with Uganda,  Senegal and
Rwanda,  although around 30 countries have expressed
rnterest.
Recently CIPLA,  a generic  manufacturer  in India has
announced that it will be offering HIV/AIDS anti
retrovirals at heavily discounted prices for Africa.
And on 7 March 2001, Merck has announced that it
will significantly reduce prices of rwo antiretroviral
medicines  for the treatment of HIV infection in order
to help speed access for the developing world. Through
these actions, industry hopes that governments and
other stakeholders will address other related  aspects,
such as imoroved  healthcare  infra structures  with
trained rt"if, l"bo.",ory  supporr and reliable distribu-
tion systems.
Of course, a differential price system can only work if
we avoid product  diversion and re-importation. This
could be io.te by legislative  and regulitory  measures,
but also other efforts such as labelling  could help pre-
vent diversion ofcheaper  products to higher priced
markets. The European  Commission  has issued a paper
on this topic and is actually consulting  the Member
States on the issue. The Commission  has expressed  the
wish to discuss  the issue with the US Government.  The
Commission  also agrees with industry that a differen-
tial pricing system can not be seen in isoladon: other
trade and health related  measures  such as taxes and tar-
iffs on pharmaceuticals  in developing countries, techni-
cal assistance on intellectual  properry  issues, strength-
ening pharmaceutical policies and delivering  structures,
development of local capacity,,training on treatment
programmes are examples of the comprehensive  policy
which the EC is pursuing through its Programme for
Action.
The Commission also agrees with
industry that a differential pricing
system can not be seen in isolation
The Commission  cannot do this on its own. It needs
partners;  we will look to the \W'HO and the UN, the
\7orld Bank, NGO's, the US and other G8 members
and -not to forget- EU Member States in order to help
setting up a global strategy and promote  the reform of
the international financial  structure,  necessary for an
increased availabiliry  of pharmaceuticals and global
public goods and to support  greater co-ordination and
effi ciency of international funding.
The new US Administration  has indicated not to be
able yet to support  the ECt policy on a differential
pricing system as the \White House is undertaking  a
strategic review of this important  area. At the moment,
various contacts  are the highest level are taking place
on which we hope to be able to report the outcome at
the l4 June EU-US Summit in Gciteborg.
The Summit Statement on this topic can be found in the
Commissionls  US website pages :
h ttp  : /  /  e uro  p a. e u. in t/  c o mm /  ex tern a l_re h t i o ns / us /s um -
m it 1 2 -0 
0/afi  ica-dis eas es. h tm
Afact sheet on'heabh,  aids and population'is reachable
at : h xp : /  /  europa. eu. i nt/comm/external_re ktio ns/us/
a c tio n-p lan/  2 jo  b a l_c h a I lenges  _re leas e. h tmView from \Washington
The ELJ and the new Administration
It is still too earlv to orovide a
detailed 
"rr.rr-irrt 
oi th. ,r.*
Administration's  attitudes
towards the European Union,
although EU representarives
have already engaged key mem-
bers of President Bush's sov€rn-
ment through 
" 
nu-b.r"of  high-
level meetings covering  a broad
agenda, from foreign and securi-
ry policies to energy and environment matters. In addi-
tion, -Washington 
has witnessed many bilateral visitors
from Member States, although it is not clear to what
extent these will have reinfoiced the new
Administration's understanding of European  Union
policies.
The Cabinet of President  Bush is clearlv comoosed  of a
number of highly accomplished individuals.  S..t.,".y
of State Colin Powell and his colleagues bring impecca-
ble credentials to their work. In many cases, however,
they have been out ofactive political life for eight years
during which time many developments  have occurred
in Europe, including the expanded  capabilities of the
European  Union as a global actor. The new U.S. Tiade
Representative, Bob Zoellick, however, has extensive
knowledee  of the EU. Moreover, EU officials who
have met'with  Secretary Powell have been impressed by
his confident  grasp ofinternational affairs and his gen-
eral support for European  integration.  This perspective
has also been reflected in the statements of other
Cabinet officials and President  Bush himself.
\7e must also have to recognise  that the new President
has to work with a Congress that plays an increasingly
important role in the foreign policy process, and which
has unfortunately  become less internationalist  in its per-
spective. Senator  Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina) con-
tinues as Chair of the Senate Foreign  Relations
Committee,  and it is well known that on a number of
subjects  his views differ from ours. In the House of
Representatives,  Henry Hyde (R-Illinois) is the new
Chair of the International  Relations  Committee,  replac-
ing Ben Gilman (R-New York). Mr. Gilman demon-
strated great interest in promoting the 'Tiansatlantic
Legislators Dialogue' and this has been more than slow
to restart. A new Subcommittee on Europe chaired by
Elton Gallegly (R-California)  has also been formed. To
date we have not been able to meet with Mr. Gallegly
but hope this will be remedied  soon.
A broad array ofissues  will feature in our near-term
agenda with the new Administration  and the Congress,
representing  all the policy'chapters' of the NTA.
These include the well known global challenges, such
as the environment,  transnational crime, and infectious
diseases;  both bilateral and multilateral trade issues;
and foreign and security issues, such as our continued
co-operation in the Balkans and the development of
the ESDP and its relationship to NAIO.
Developing a successful modus uiaendi for working
through  multilateral bodies in response  to the many
issues raised by globalisation will be challenging.  The
United States has shown itself uncomfortable  in agree-
ing to multilateral responses to global issues such as the
environment, non-proliferation, and the International
Criminal Court. Again, it is too early to fairly assess
the attitudes of the new Administration,  but we would
hope, for example, that President  Bush will take a more
positive stance  than indicated by recent statements
related to the issue of climate change and implementa-
tion of the Kyoto Protocol. A recent visit by
Commissioner \Wallstrom  m on this topic allowed dis-
cussion with Administration  officials but yielded linle
Progress.
US Ambassador  Zoellick and
Commissioner  Lamy noted
the importance  of dealing with
our list of economic 'irritants'
in a constructive manner
'We also hope that President  Bush and Bob Zoellick
will be successful  in their promised effort to win fast
track or 'trade promotion authoriry' from the
Congress, not only for the Free Tiade Agreement of the
Americas, but also and most importantly for a new
\7TO Round. In a joint press conference held at the
Delegation, Amb. Zoellick and Commissioner  Lamy
also noted the importance  of dealing with our list of
economic 'irritants' in a constructive manner to avoid
any collateral damage to the WTO.
There is every reason to expect that
the new Administration  will appreciate
the added value that ESDP as
a whole will bring to the
transatlantic partnership.
One might add that Amb. Zoellick's  decision to make
the journey to our offices - not a common  event for
high-ranking  Administration  officials - to meet
Commissioner  Lamy was both a sign of his respect  for
the Commissioner  and a gesture conveying his desire
to deal with these issues in an open and frank manner.
This positive exchange has recently been confirmed  by
their abiliry to strike a deal on bananas, a development
that bodes well for future co-operation.
There is every reason to expect that the new
Administration will appreciate the added value that
ESDP as a whole will bring to the transatlantic part-
nership. Secretary Powell and others have made posi-
tive comments regarding  ESDB provided that it com-
plements NATO, but there are some in Washington
and particularlv  in the Consress who continue  roapproach ESDP with a mixture of scepticism  and fear.
They are sceptical about the EU's abiliry to produce a
Rapid Reaction  Force by 2003, and fearful that it will
somehow detract from NATO. This point of view is
similar to the 'inside the Beltway' perspective that first
met the single market program and the Euro. One
noted Belrway analyst has been so bold as to predict
that ESDP will not be a realiry before 2010!
tWe have much to build on through
the NTA process [...] and
much to conffibute to the
international communiry if
we can work well together.
It is my hope that, as Euro notes and coins will be cir-
culated in January 2002, as the enlargement process
moves forward, and as our ESDP headline goals are
realised, the new Administration  and others in the U.S.
will develop  added appreciation for the EU's capabili-
ties and its increasing  role as a global partner. \7e have
much to build on through the NTA process, with the
Commission's  recent proposal  likely to receive a sym-
pathetic hearing in the State Department and else-
where in the Administration,  and much to contribute
to the international communiry if we can work well
together. Our task at the W'ashington  Delegation is to
help convince the new Administration  that it is also in
their best interests to do so.
Dr. Giinter Burghardt
Ambassador  and Head of Delegation
Delegation  of the Europian  Cimmission
\Vasbington,  DC
In the spotlight
US National Missile Defence and
the need to maintain strategic stability
The terms of the debate on the US National Missile Defence $/stem haue radically euolued since
September  last, when President Clinton decided to postpone the decision of an euentual limited
National Missih Defence (NMD) dzployment.  Tbday, Presidznt Buslt seems d.etermined  to proceed
with the deployment  of a broader missile defence system, though tlte nature, extent and timing, of
the project remain to be defined.
\Xr'hile the decision  on how the US want to defend its
territory and protect its people from a possible missile
threat is, within the bounds of its international com-
mitments,  a sovereign one, the EU legitimately  wants
to ensur€ that this will not negatively  affect the inter-
national stabiliry and our own securiry. A number of
questions,  and concerns,  remain, regarding the poten-
tial implications of the missile defence project on the
global strategic  balance, as well as on the multilateral
disarmament and non-oroliferation framework.  The
EU expects these will be addressed  during the in-depth
consultations that both Secretary of State Colin Powell
and Defence  Secretary Donald Rumsfeld have commit-
ted to hold with US Allies,  as well as with Russia  and
China. It is further expected that these will be fully
integrated in, and help shape,  the ongoing  overall
Defence policy review and progressive elaboration of
the missile  defence project.
NMD:Anewissue?
fu the NMD is often quickly referred to as an off-
spring of the SDI (or "Star'Wars")  launched in 1983, it
is worth recalling that the first attempt  at elaborating
an anti-missile defence system, in reaction to the
Russian Spoutnik launch, dates back rc the 1957
BAMBI'. Of all its successors, the 1991 GPALS, then
due for deployment in 1996 and aiming at accidental
( )  Ballistic Anri-Missile Boost lnterceptor,  envisioning  Russian  ICBM interception  by satellite-based missiles,  wa abandoned  in 1964. f wo followed  by the 1967 Sentinel
programme,  projecing  an ambitious  array ofground-based  nuclru-headed interception  missiles  / ndare,  followed  by the comparable  but anti-ballistic Safcguard project,
down-sizel after the conclusion  of rhe 1972  ABMTreary.The  SDI aimed at defending  againsr  a masive Russim  inrercontinental ballistic  attack; along wirh the end of the Cold
Var,  it gave way ro rhe l99l GPAIJ (Globd  Protection  against Limited Strikes : 1000 ground-bsed  intercptors  targeting  a porential  of200 incoming missiles).  The NMD
pfanned a 2-phced  deploymenr  (2O0517  and 2010)  and comprised  summarily:  early-warning  radars  detecting  launches, a command  md conuol  sysrem  activaring  satellires  and
an x-band radar in Alaska nronitoring missiles  flight, 100 + 150 ground-based  "hit to kill" interceptors.  Cumulated *penditures  from 1957 to 2000  are esrimated at l20Bn$.or unauthorised strikes from an undefined origin,
comes  the closest to the NMD concept, sketched out
in recent years as a protection against a limited missile
attack by "rogue States" (25 warheads). The protection
of the sole US national territory against such a threat
was the initial purpose of the NMD, as envisaged in
199912000,  whereas Theatre Missile Defence  systems
were to shield US troops deployed  abroad..  As 2 out of
3 intercept  tests failed, while the successful  one was
deemed as only partially conclusive, President Clinton,
also taking into account international objections, left
the deployment decision  to his successor.
MD : as yet an Unidentified but politically
Flntg Object
The approach  taken by President  Bush marks a general
shift. The deployment decision is presented as irre-
versible, though  the US intends to consult closely with
its Allies and international partners  on its development.
It is purported to encompass a much wider political
and geographical  scope, while the technical solution(s)
remain undefined. As repeatedly stated since January,
"the policy is to deploy missile defences  that are capa-
ble of defending not only the US, but also friends and
allies and deployed forces overseas, and to do it based
on the best available options  at the earliest possible
date". NMD has in the meantime lost its'National',
becoming simply Missile Defence (MD). The acronym
change may have a variery of different interpretations.
The outcome of the ongoing policy review due to be
announced by end Spring / early Summer, will likely
present only general orientations  and a set ofoptions
to be further explored; any system will not be defined
for some time to come.
What Threat?
The perception of the threat is a key issue. Amid a
controversy  on the CIA assessed extent ofthe projected
or actual ballistic threat, in July 1998, the bipartisan
Commission  headed by M. Rumsfeld, who became
Defence  Secretary  January  last, concluded to the need
of developing a NMD, on the basis of an alarmist
assessment of the threat emanating from rogue  States,
nonvithstandine  the Russian and Chinese  arsenals. The
DPRK inter-coitinental  Taepo-Dong flight-test, one
month later, though it ultimately failed, confirmed to
many in the US the validiry of the gloomiest scenarios.
\X/hile the EU and US, as Members of the MTCR
(Missile  Technology Control  Regime)  share serious
concerns at the dangers of increasing  missile prolifera-
tion, and to a large extent share the projection that, if
they can afford it, some States (like DPRK, Iran, but
also India...) might acquire in the mid-term  (2015)  an
intercontinental  ballistic capacity; yet our analysis dif-
fer as to the reality and credibility of the threat. \il/hile
the US assessment is primarily  based on the technical
capability  (here, capabilities in the making), the
European  approach  takes a more global view of the
threat, combining the political factor of a hostile intent
and the actual technical capabiliw. It is hard to detect /
project such a degree of "rogue States" hostile intent
towards the US that would lend credibility to a future
ballistic threat. Countries  of concern have mainly
embarked in missile  Drosrammes to address their
regional circumstancis;  Jespite their blackmailing
attemDts  as well as the rhetoric on rheir unoredictabili-
ry it ii unlikely that any of those regimes  would risk a
US nuclear retaliatory  strike that would eliminate their
country from the world map.
This has led many to question whether the handy but
heavy-loaded  .ont.pt of ".ogtt. States"  was not actual-
Iy covering China,  whose strategic potential matches
well the projected NMD initial capabilities?  Despite
US official assurances to the contrary, yet along with
conflicting statements on the emerg€nce of regional /
global competitors  to the US, both China and Russia
view Missile Defence  as a means of neutralisins  early
on Chinas striking capabiliry and in a much lSnger-
term, Russia's, if the system  was to reach a much-
broader deployment.  Both have indicated that they
would reaci to an US deployment,  in violation of ihe
ABM Tieary by increasing  their capabilities, thus
relaunching the strategic arms race. Against this highly
destabilising prospect,  we would need to debate further
whether the MD is the appropriate response to the per-
ceived / actual threat, and whether diplomatic tools,
developing our poliry oFengagement  with potentially
hostile States, and consolidating  the co-operative
approach  to ensure due respect for multilateral com-
mitments,  would not better serve our purpose.
ABM Theaty - a "post-Cold War relic"?
The ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treary, further to the
NPT (Non-Proliferation Tieary), is essential to main-
tain the strategic stability. Though it indeed  enshrined
the logic of the Cold \Var', it has been amended  since,
and its importance and relevance  go way beyond the
fall of the Berlin 'Wall, as it is intrinsically linked to
bilateral and multilateral disarmament commitments.
It was signed on the 261511972 along with the first
SALT protocol (Strategic Armaments Limitation  Talks)
and referred  to in ulterior Arms Control Agreements.
The ABM Tieary prohibits the deployment of Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems  to cov€r the whole of the terri-
torv of each Parw. It then limited the deployment of
an Anti-Ballistic  Missile svstem to 2 areai (each capital
and one ICBM silo launcher), and limited to l00ihe
number of ABM launchers  and of interceptor  missiles,
while ceilings were set on the number and capaciry of
radars allowed (the Alaska radar, on which Pres.
Clinton postponed a decision, did not conform  to the
ABM Tieaw). It was later amended  by a Protocol of
317lT4,limiiing ABM deployment t; one site only
(Russia : Moscow, US : Grand Forks, N. Dakota).
The Treaty provided for a five-yearly review, that took
place in 1977, 82, 88 and 1993, devising  funher the
definition  and scope ofthe Theary. Finally, a package of
Agreements  was signed in New York on 2619197, cov-
ering2 issues : the question of Tleary succession  after
the dissolution  of the USSR. Though the designation
of successor States is settled by international  Law
(,)  lr u'as  negotiated  at US requesr, ro contain the developmenr  ofRussian ABM systems  perceived as undermining  the still prevalent MAD doctrine (Mutual  Assured
Destruction, soon after abandoned);  rhe US then  considered  ABM systems  as being  both offensive  and defensive, when Russia  viwed  them as only defensive, and, much o
the US today, argued thar it allowed  it to rely for irs defence on its own capacities, rather  than  on the "goodwill"  of the other Parry(Russia has succeeded to USSR in the UN), an adapta-
tion of the ABM Tieary was needed to encompass
those ABM elements deployed  in other NIS; thus
Russia,  Belarus. Kazakhstan  and Ukraine  have been
designated as successor States, collectively limited to a
single ABM site. The second issue related to the
demarcation berween those ABM strategic systems lim-
ited by the Tieary and tactic/non-ABM  systems,  left
outside of the Tieary (missiles carried  by bombers,
cruise missiles, or "euro-missiles" stationed outside one
Parryt territory...). The 1997 package provided for
technical specifications  that, roughly summarised,
aimed at delineating possible  Theatre Missile Defence
against missiles "other than strategic ballistic missiles",
and a set of Confidence Building Measures (nodfica-
tion of tests, exchange  of information). These agree-
ments thus enabled the US to deploy the PAC-3,
THAAD and Navyt Theater-Wide  Defence  systems.
These successive amendments  and interpretations of
rhe Tieary  have proven the abiliry ofboth (and later, 5)
Parties to negotiate and agree to appropriate changes,
in line with the political and technological evolutions.
Given the time-frame envisaged  for the definition of
the MD project, we thus see further scope for the
Parties to negotiate  the necessary amendments. For
what has transpired, the negotiations held with Russia
by the Clinton Administration did not appear to fore-
close further compromise and co-operation. Therefore,
it is highly questionable  to consider  that the ABM
Tieaw is nowadavs deemed as "a relic of the Cold
Vzar". The Tieary has withstood the trial of time and
succession of States. An unilateral withdrawals from the
ABM would doubtless send to the world an implicit
message  : the US does not consider  itself bound by its
international  commitments  and an outdated pariry
based on mutual deterrence (thus equally mutual
engagement), in a situation where unmatched techno-
logical and financial means might eventually one day
allow for a defence of its territory that both pre-empts
others' strategic striking capabiliry  while consolidating
its own offensive capability?  If this was to become US
doctrine, this would radically alter the current  geo-
strategic balance.
Pacta sunt servanda
Europe,  having been directly exposed at the heart of
the Cold 'Wat cannot but view with concern the con-
sequences of such a move, and calls on the US to abide
by its international  obligations, while negotiating
amendments  to the ABM Tieary with Russia, to avoid
upsetting the strategic equilibrium and prevent a
renewed arms race.
"Pacta sunt servanda" is the principle that has governed
for centuries international  relations, upsening it is risk-
ing to unravel  not only the ABM Treaty, but the set of
interrelated successive arms limitation and reduction
agreements (SALT I/II, START V II, INF...). Such a
move, following the rejection by Congress, 2 years ago,
of the ratification of the CTBT (Comprehensive  Test
Ban Tieary), whose negotiation had been initiated by
the US, would be a very negative signal for the interna-
tional communiry. A second US disengagement would
risk to upset the whole set of Arms Control and Non-
Proliferation  Tieaties,  developed  over the 40 last years,
thereby transforming  the global strategic  balance. Our
efforts at consolidating  the strategic  stabiliry through a
co-operative approach based on multilateral commit-
ments (accepting  constraints as a result of reciprocal
concessions from others), should not be discarded
without making  a proper assessment of the wider con-
sequences for the global stabiliry which indeed would
affect  as much the US', as our long-term securiry inter-
ests in their broadest  sense.
The risk of belief in absolute security
The idea underlying  MD, as a much broader concept
than TMD, is a quest for an absolute securiry  as an
evidently preferable  option to exposing  one's popula-
tion to the threat underlying the concept of mutual
deterrence. The shift from deterrence to defence, or
protecting the national  territory  by relying on onet
own capaciry is indeed highly amractive; it can howev-
er not be separated from the fact that the international
strategic  balance cannot be unilaterally  defined, nor
can technological and military superioriry  ensure
absolute  securiry.
On the technical side, while downplaying  the succes-
sion of abandoned  missile defence programmes men-
tioned above,  we can project that the amount  of R/D
involved will indeed produce some technological  break-
throughs, given the financial  and technological  means
the Defence  industries have been so convincingly lob-
bying for (at least 4Bn$/Y). But will they suffice to
develop  an operable  integrated system?
On the strategic  scene, there could be more negative
consequences : Vill the high profile given to MD actu-
ally entice 'rogue states' to develop missile programmes
in order to enhance however  limited their deterrence
capacity is? Vill the US security be reinforced i[, as
they already indicated,  Russia and China view the MD
as effectively neutralising  their deterrence  capaciry  and
adapt the means to restore it?
fu for Europe itself, its geopolitical  position forces it to
assess the impact of an MD deployment  on its relation-
ship with neighbouring  Russia, who has already hinted
at its possible reaction to a changed arms limitation
framework,  as well as on, as a result from a sole domes-
tic decision, the possible induced decoupling  effbct on
the NATO Alliance.
These are but only some of the questions  one might
expect Europe will want to raise with its US Ally, when
the needed in-depth consultations will take place.
The EU remains committed to work for a safer World,
and this context hopes that this matter will continue to
be debated and negotiated under the current  mecha-
nisms for transatlantic co-operation,  including the
NTA. Any proposed  departure from previous commit-
ments should be carefully assessed by all the parties
concerned.  Action should serve to make the Vorld
safer, avoiding creating concerns within other
Countries  which might in turn increase unstabiliry and
fuel an escalation ofdefensive  responses towards per-
ceived threats.
(')  Of unlimited duration, thc Treary foresees a 6 month prior notification ofa daision ro wirhdraq with  a "sratement  of rhe utraordinary  events ...considered  o having
jopardised  the Parry's supremc interesrs".
t0EU-US Thade Disputes: managing conflicts
Signifcant breahthrough was achieued 0n lne of the longex running disputes between the two sides:
In April200I,  an und.erstanding  was reaclted on resoluing the dispute ouer banana imports into the EU.
The Commission continues t0 belieue that preuenting new disputes and managing ongoing conflicts
remain essential to maintain a ualuable trade and inuestment  partnership  and auoid escalation.
The understandings  reached with the US on Foreign  Sales Corporations,  at the end of last year
and now on the EU banana import regime demonstrate the EU's willingness  to actiuely engage in
a dialogue  to solue the major outstanding disputes.
The Communiry has presently l5 active \ilTO dis-
outes underway'with ih. U"ii.d States. In 1l out of
ihese 15 dispuies,  it is the Community  which is the
complaininf party:7 in the area of US misuse of trade
defence mechanisms  and subsidies, notably in the steel
sector, three in the area of intellectual  property  rights
and one concerning the so-called Carousel  leeislation
allowins  the US ro rotate sanctions. The US is the
complaining  parry in four cases in the agricultural  sec-
tor: imoorts of bananas, imoorts of hormone  treated
beef, cusroms duties for rice imporred into Belgium
and imports of corn gluten feed.
Current maior cases launched
by the Community
Cases on US trade defence instruments and subsidies
US 1916 Anti-Dumping Act: In August 2000, the
WTO Appellate Body condemned the 1916 US Anti-
Dumping Act. Two European  companies  are still facing
a judicial challenge before US courts on the basis of the
l9l6 Act. There is a possibiliry  that those firms be
condemned and that new cases be broueht before the
law is repealed.  A \7TO Arbitrator rulei on 28
February  2001 that the reasonable  period of time for
the US to implement the \WTO Appellate Body ruling
ends on 26 July 2001. The Communiry will closely
monitor US implementation.
US safeguards on imports of wheat gluten: In
December  2000, the WTO Appellate Body con-
demned the US safesuard measures on imports of
wheat gluten in the Form of quantitative ristricrions.
The US did not commit itself to implement the ruling,
but adopted,  on 31 Mav 2001, an .u.n -or. restrictiie
system and is considering a two year extension  of the
measures.  On24 January  2001, the EC introduced  a
re-balancing  measure (different  from sanctions,  i.e. sus-
pension ofequivalent concessions on corn gluten feed)
which was challenged  by the US. The EC continues to
expect that the US fully comply with the'W'TO ruling.
'Byrd amendment':  The'Byrd amendment'  signed into
law last October  provides  that the proceeds from anti-
dumping and countervailing  dury cases be paid to the
US companies  responsible  for. bringing the,cases. This
provision appears incompatible  with several\7TO  pro-
visions. On 22 December 2000, the Community  and
eight other \WTO Members requested'WTO consulta-
tions with the US which were held on 6 February
2001, but which did not lead to any result.
US countervailing measures on privatised  EU compa-
nies (follow-up to the'British Steel'case): In May
2000, the \X/TO Appellate Body condemned the coun-
tervailing  duties imposed by the US on British  Steel's
exports  of lead and bismuth steel from the UK. The
US had wrongly presumed  that British Steel plc. had
benefited from subsidies granted to its predecessor,  the
state-owned  British Steel Corporation, before its pri-
vatisation. The Communitv  requested \7TO consulta-
tions in 14 other cases where the US had applied the
condemned methodology  against EU companies  and
these were held in December 2000. Althoueh the US is
forced to review this methodology, it still rJuses to
take account of the VTO ruling. Following  the appli-
cation by the US of a new methodology, which also
appears  to violate \7TO provisions, the Communiry
reouested .WTO consultations on this new methodolo-
gyind these were held in April 2001. The Communiry
sees .WTO consultations as a further attempt  to resolve
this question in a speedy and satisfactory  manner and
continues to hope that a successful  conclusion to these
consultations will avoid the need to launch a number
of new dispute settlement cases although,  as yet, no
agreement has been reached.
US application of de-minimis rules in anti-dumping
and counter-veiling duty (AD/CVD) sunset reviews:
In rwo cases, the US recommended continuation of
AD/CVD measures,  in spite of the amounts of dump-
ing and subsidy  being beiow the currenr de-minimis-
levels. In December 2000 and March 2001, \flTO
consultations were held with the US on these cases
without achieving any progress.
US safeguard measures on imports of steel wire rod
and welded line pipe: In March 2000, the US intro-
duced rwo safeguard measures on imports of steel wire
rod and imports of welded line pipe in the form of a
tariff increase  above a tariff quota. The Communiry
requested formal'WTO consultations, which took
place on 26 January 2001.
Foreign Sales Corporations (FSC): This case is by far
the largest in economic terms. In February  2000, the
VTO Appellate Body condemned the income tax
exemption  afforded to US exporters  by means of FSCs
as an export subsidy inconsistent with WTO provi-
sions. On l5 November 2000, the US adopted a new
system, which, in the Communiry's  view, remains
WTO incompatible.  Both sides agreed in September
2000 that a new \WTO Panel would review this new
US system. This WTO Panel was requested on 17
November 2000 and should complete its work in mid
2001. Furthermore,  at the end of November 2000, the
EC requested authorisation  from the \7TO to adopt
co.r.ttei-."rr:res asainst the US in order to preserve its
rights. Howe,r.r, tK.r. countermeasures will not be inplace earlier than spring-summer next year and only if
the WTO has concluded that the new legislation is still
a prohibited export subsidy.  A consultation  process
with industry  and Member  States is under considera-
tion in order to define the list of products subject to
possible sanctions in order to minimise  any possible
impact on EU industry.
Cases on intellectual property  rigbts
Section  1 10 of the US Copyright  Act: On 1 5 June 2000,
a VTO Panel condemned Section 110 of the US
Copyright  Act containing  an exemption to the exclu-
sive rights of authors when their music is played in
bars, restaurants or shops via a radio or TV. On 15
January 2001, aVTO fubitrator ruled that the reason-
able time for the US to implement  the ruling ends on
27 July 2001. The Communiry expects  the US to
adopt the necessary legislative  change by the due date.
Section 211 of the U.S. Omnibus Appropriations Act:
In June 2000, the Community  requested the establish-
ment of a 1VTO Panel concernins  Section 2l I which
is designed to diminish the rights-under the \WTO
TRIPs Agreement  of owners of US trademarks  which
are identical or similar to trademarks  which previously
belonged to a Cuban national or company which was
expropriated in the course of the Cuban revolution. In
January and March 2001,'$7TO  Panel hearings took
place and a ruling is expected by summer 2001.
Section  337 of the 1930 ThriffAct: Under Section
337, rhe US International  Tiade Commission  (ITC)
may declare the importation into the US of articles
infringing US intellectual properry rights illegal. In a
number of ways, foreign respondents under Section
337 investigations  receive  less favourable  treatment
than US respondents in comparable  cases thus violat-
ing the national treatment principle of the GAIT and
certain procedural requirements  contained in the
TRIPs Agreement. In 1989, Section  337 was already
condemned  by a GAIT panel, but despite certain
amendments  by the US in 1994 the US appears not to
have brought the statute into conformiry with tne
GATT Panel's findings. The Communiry requested
1WTO consultations, which took place in February
2000. The Commission  is currently  reviewing the
results of these consultations.
Cases dealing with US unilateralism
'Carousel': The 'Carousel  legisladon provides  for a
mandatory and unilateral revision of the list of prod-
ucts subject to sanctions against imports from \7TO
Members  which have been determined not to have
implemented \7TO rulings. The Community  request-
ed VTO consultations, which were held on 5 July
2000. The Communiry will request the establishment
of a \VTO panel should the legislation be applied and
sanctions rotated.
Current maior cases launched
against the Community
'Bananas':  In the past, two European  Union banana
regimes  were challenged successfully in the \7TO,
prompting US retaliation  against EU products. On l1
April 2001, the US Government and the European
Commission  reached an understanding to resolve  this
long-standing dispute.
A new EU regime will provide a transition to a tariff-
only system by 2006. During the transition, bananas
wilfbi imporied into the EIi through import licences
distributed on the basis of past trade. The new system
is scheduled to take effect on I July 2001 on which
date the US will suspend the sanctions  imposed against
EU imoorts since 1999. After the transition, a tariff-
only syitem is scheduled to take effect on I January
2006.
The understanding  marks  a significant  breakthrough.  It
demonstrates  the commitment of the Bush
Administration  and the European Commission  to work
together closely and effectively on trade issues. Most
important, both parties agreed  that the rime had come
to end a dispute *hi"tr nia led to prolonged conflict in
the world trading  system.
The European  Commission  will shortly table the nec-
essary proposals to the Council and the European
Parliament in order to fully implement the agreement.
'Hormones': In February 1998, the'S7TO condemned
the EU ban on imports of beef produced with growth
promoting hormones since it was not based on a suffi-
ciently specific  risk assessment. The Commission,
therefore, decided to carry out such an assessment, in
line with indications  given by the WTO. \While await-
ing the results of the ongoing  assessment,  the US was
authorised by the VTO to suspend concessions equiv-
alent to the losses to their industries caused by the
maintenance of the Community  import ban. On 5
May 2000, the Commission  adopted a proposal to
amend the'hormones directive'.  In addition, further
studies will be launched with the objective of obtaining
more complete scientific information. The
Commission  proposal is not yet adopted. In the mean-
time, the Community  still has every interest to convert
present US sanctions  into compensatory tariff reduc-
tions. The US has showed some interest in increased
market access for non-hormone treated  beef and both
sides are engaged in negotiating  a possible trade-
enhancing compensation package. Howevet  the drop
in the EU market following the BSE crisis and the long
lead time needed by the US industry to gear up hor-
mone free production recendy diminished the
prospects for an amicable  solution.
Customs duties for rice imported  into Belgium: The
US requested'W'TO  consultations with Belgium  over
the establishment of customs  duties for the importa-
tion of rice under the cumulative  recovery systam.
These consultations were held in November  2000 and
the US subsequently  requested the establishment of the
\WTO Panel. However, it appeared that the purpose of
the US complaint was rather to strengthen the position
of a US company currently involved in a court case
before  a Belgian Court.
TariFrate  quota on corn gluten feed imported from
the US: On 24 January  2001, the Community  adopt-
ed a tariFrate quota in accordance with the specific
provisions of the IW'TO Safeguard Agreement further
to the adopdon of the \7TO rulings on the US $fheat
Gluten safeguard measures  (see above). This quota
aims at re-balancing\7TO concessions and has noth-
ing to do with retaliation. It will obviously  cease to be
applied as soon as the US safeguard measure on wheat
gluten is withdrawn. On 25 January 2001, the US
requested WTO consultations, which it justified main-
ly on alleged procedural violations  by the EC.
More information  on this subject can be found at:
h ttp  : /  /  e urop a. e u. in t/  c o mm/ tradr / b i ktera l/  us a/  us a. h tmUN financial reform and US arrears
The end of last year has shown some successes in the
relation of the US to the UN, which will have an
impact on Americans leadership  role in the organisa-
tion and on EU-US relations in general.  On behalf of
the US Government,  President Clinton signed the
1998 Rome Tieaty on the International Criminal
Court. By doing so, the US joined more than 130
other countries that have signed by December 31
2000, the deadline  established in the treaty. The
European  Union has welcomed the US signature  to
this important UN Theary and indicated its readiness  to
further co-operate with the US to find mutually
acceptable solutions to those outstanding  issues,  which
could be hampering ratification by US Congress.
Secondlv. a solution  has been found in the UN
General'Assemblyt  finance committee  on the problems
in relation to UN financial  reform and payments  of US
arrears to the UN budget. Before this major break-
through,  the picture was rather bleak the US owed
more than $t billion to the UN*, had lost its seat in
the UN budgett committee  and was on the verge of
being suspended of its voting rights in the UN General
fusembly. The main problem  was the so called Helms-
Biden bill (November  1999) linking the repayment of
US arrears to the UN to UN financial  reform - i.a.
zero growth of the UN budget- and to the reduction  of
US contributions to the world organisation ( from
25o/o to 22o/o on the regular  budget and from 3lo/o to
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25o/o on peacekeeping contributions).
The final agreement indeed  lower the US contributions
to the regular  budget to 22o/o and for the peace keep-
ing budget to about 27 o/o this year and 26.5  o/o by
2003. Although discussions on the cap for the US con-
tribution to the peace keeping budget will continue in
the US Senate, it has agreed to release $582 million
dollars to be paid to the UN this year. Part of the
arrears had been paid last year and another part will be
released next year. A final agreement on some out-
standing questions  between the US and the UN,
among which are contested  arrears* need to be solved
by 2003.
The EU has shown relative  satisfaction  with the solu-
tion. In total the 15 EU countries count for more than
a third of the contributions to the UN regular budget
(around 36137 o/o) and to the peace keeping budget (a
slight increase  is foreseen to 40o/o this year). But, the
main objective that the scale of contributions should be
linked to UN Member  States capaciry to pay has been
achieved. The EU will continue to monitor this com-
plex issue, including in relation to contributions to the
UN specialised agencies.
* According to the UN, the US owed $ 1,568 billion to
the UN, howeuer according to Washington  the amount of
AtreArs was $926 million.
The EU Centres extend their reach
The call for applications for selecting the Centres which
will be part of the EU Centres newtwork  2nd rycle was
closed on 5 April. Among the large number of applica-
tions received, the Commission will have to determine,
with the help of an independent advisory committee,
which  are the most cost-efFective  in the implementation
of activities  proposed, having at the same time the
capacity  to mobilise resources to complement the
Commissiont  grant; demonstrating their capaciry to
achieve the fundamental goals of the initiative, and
adding  value to existing activities, and achieving  a far-
reaching impact. Interviews with potential  future
Centres will be held between May and June 2001.
One of the features of this second rycle is an increased
focus on outreach  activities  which, to the greatest  Pos-
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sible extent, should be emphasised in the Centres'pro-
grammes, without prejudice of other activities. In
accordance with EU principles,  an explicit focus on
less-favoured groups was also suggested in the request
for proposals.  Publication  of texts or implementation
of activities in other languages  of EU origin were also
advised.
fu in the past, the network will be co-ordinatec,  pro-
moted and evaluated by an independent institution.
The Commission  is actively  working in preparing
another call for proposals to this end, which will hope-
fully see the light in the coming weeks.
More information  about tbe EU Centres can be found at :
h trp : /  /  eic e n te rs.  o rg/
13Ban on Animal Tested Cosmetics
On 3 April 2001 the European  Parliament approved  a
European-wide ban on all cosmetic products tested on
animals and the preservation  of a marketing  ban. This
legislation  would come into effect immediately  for
ingredients  where other validated testing methods exist,
and in any case five years after the adoption ofthe
directive.  The ban will prevent  the import into the EU
of products tested on animals in third countries.  This
will have a significant impact on the cosmetics trade
berween the EU and US where there is a legal require-
ment for safery tests to be carried  out on animals.
A marhetingban on cosmetics ingredients tested on
animals was originally passed in 1998 (when the sixth
amendment to Directive  761 l7688lEEC  was adopted).
However  the ban never came into efFect due to the lack
of alternative t€sting methods. At present only three
such methods  have been validated.  There were also
problems  with the marketing ban contravening \World
Tiade Organisation  ('WTO) rules,
The ban now approved  by the European  Parliament
encompasses this marketine ban and a new ban on
testing. It is more ambitio"us than the initial proposal,
since the Parliament  wants to avoid exporting testingto
other countries.
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The US had previously suggested  that a ban of this
nature could see the EU neglecting its \WTO obliga-
tions. The ban could also raise trade problems between
the EU and Japan where there is no ban on animal
testing. However, within Europe representatives of the
European  Cosmetics,  Toiletries and Perfumery
fusociation (Colipa) claim the legisladon will put them
at a disadvantage compared to their competitors  in the
US and Japan. The European Parliament believes
VTO compliance will be ensured if producers in third
countries are handled in an equivalent way to
Communiry  producers,  with no discriminatory treat-
ment. In this respect, a spokesman for the\7TO has
said they will not object to legislation while a level
playing field.is maintained  between  EU and third
country Proqucers.
The Commission  has long supported alternatives  to
animal testing. It has sought to achieve a balance
berween animal welfare  concerns,  consumer protection,
industrial innovation, and the need to meet interna-
tional obligations.  It is hoped that the ban approved by
the European Parliament will succeed in making  a pos-
itive contribution  to animal welfare.
EP adopts Resolution on Colombia
On 1 February 2001, the European  Parliament passed
a Resolution on Plan Colombia  and support for the
peace process in Colombia.  The Plan has been the
object of some controversy  across the Atlantic.
Recalling  the undertaking  given by the Clinton admin-
istration and President Pastrana in September  1999 on
the ioint implementation  of a'plan for peace, prosperi-
ty and the strengthening of the state', the Resolution
reiterated  the Parliament's firm support for the peace
process initiated by Colombian President Pastrana  and
urged the parties to pursue their efforts in this regard.
At the same time, and in contrast with the positions
adopted by the US Administration and Legislators,  the
Resolution  was highly critical of Plan Colombia.
Effons to bring Peace in Colombia  should involve
social development.  Aerial crop-spraying and the use
ofbiological  agents are negative for people and for the
environment. The lack of civil society involvement  was
also criticised. Even more importantly, stepping up
military involvement in the fight against drugs involves
the risk of an escalation of the conflict in the region.
Plan Colombia  contains  aspects that run cou.rtei to the
co-operation strategies  and projects to which the EU
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has already committed itself and jeopardise  its co-oper-
arron Programmes.
According  to the EB the European Union must sup-
port the aspects of the peace process which involve the
strengthening of institutions, alternative development,
humanitarian aid and social development, since these
are the ones which are most in accordance with its co-
operation  strategy. The European Union action should
pursue its own, non-military  strategy combining neu-
traliry transparency,  the participation ofcivil society
and undertakings from the parties ofthe negotiations.
The EP welcomed the proposal by Commissioners
Patten and Nielson  to grant substantial support for the
peace efforts in Colombia and stressed that initial mea-
sures contributing  to the peace process  should be intro-
duced without delay and be aimed at promoting
respect  for human  rights, humanitarian law and funda-
mental freedoms,  improving the living conditions of
the local populations,  using civil sociery organisarions
and social movements as channels and bearing in mind
the forced displacement of a section of the rural popu-
lation, of which women  and children form the vast
majority.
t4Airbus'4.380 financing, in line with EU-US rules
On 23 April 2001, the European Commission
informed the US Administration  about the terms of
government support for the Airbus' 4'380 programme.
The information supplied to the US side confirms that
these aids fully respect  the terms and criteria  estab-
lished by the EU-US Bilateral Agreement on large
commercial  aircraft  for the development of this rype of
planes. The announcement follows the EU-US consul-
Sborts
tations held last January, and fulfils the commitment
made by Commissioner  Lamy during his recent visit to
the USA, where he undertook  to provide information
about the 4'380 financing  terms a soon as they were
available.  Reimbursement of aids and eoual trearmenr
are some of the principles on which rhe EU-US agree-
ment is based.
Continental drrrts - but less
The upcoming, devastating Tiansatlantic Tiade
\War which is just about to happen  makes regular
headlines. The media seems to have a predilection
for tansatlantic disputes. And yet the much-
announced  Tiade -War neuerhappens.  The EU and
the US remain the most reliable global allies, shar-
ing not only economic and trade interests but,
more importantly, common values and beliefs.
Then, what is all this noise about? To a large extent
the explanation is, undoubtedly,  that good news is
no news. The transatlantic partnership involves
trade flows of many hundred billion Euros. Our
mutual Foreign  Direct investment reaches similar
figures. Hundreds of thousands of jobs both sides
are a direct creation of this unique, rich relation-
ship. Unprecedented  wealth and progress  have
resulted from this. So, things go well between the
transatlantic allies. But try to make a headline
from this!
Howevet that is only part of the explanation. The
problems, helas, do exist. Tiade disputes, involving
a very small percentage of the overall figures
(between 0.2 and 2o/o), rccur with regulariry. Other
non-trade based controversies have a potentially
Tbe last utord
more damaging effect, for example differences on
climate change after the US decision  not to ratifr
the Kyoto protocol. But serious as they are, none
of these compromise , by far, the overall relation-
ship. Some disagreement  is only natural in a
healthy relationship, and the dialogue mechanisms
to solve problems are getting more and more estab-
lished.
But constant rumours and exaggerate worries con-
tinue, and they have a perverse  effect. Regular
statements about an impending trade war are void
ofcontent, but do carry a certain danger - not the
danger of fulfilling themselves (the relationship is
too solid for that), but the risk of losing in credi-
biliry and public interest. You can almost visualise
the newspaper reader exclaiming, 'oh yes, right,
trade war again'... A certain degree or restraint, or
rather accurateness in describing realiry from both
sides, is essential for a healthy relationship. And
putting things into perspective, too. If one was to
take seriously the constant rumours about the con-
tinental drifts between Europe and the US, both
sides should have already met on the antipodes -
metaphorically  speaking.
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Your comments, questions  and other input are most welcome.
To let us know what you think of EU-US News, or to ask us to add
someone to our mailihg list, please contact us, preferably by e-mail.
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